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of Indo-Iranian languages in Columbia University. The book is written in a fresh and vigorous style and relates the impressions of the journey as well as gives an interesting and instructive account of cities and monuments which this prominent Zendavesta scholar visited, thus combining popularity with scholarship.

Professor Jackson describes the route to the Land of the Lion and the Sun through Tiflis, Erivan and Mount Ararat, and the road to the Persian frontier. He sketches the history of Persia and points out our interest in the country. He journeyed through snow from Aras to Tabriz, the residence of the Crown Prince of Persia. He devotes a whole chapter to Zoroaster and the Avesta, describes his trip on camel and horse back around Lake Urumiah, the supposed early home of Zoroaster. He reaches Takht-I Suleiman, an ancient fortified town in ruins, then describes Hamadan, the ancient Ecbatana.

After devoting two chapters to the Great Behistan Rock and the cuneiform records of King Darius, he describes Tak-I Bostan and Kermanshah, and the great ruined temple of the Persian Diana at Kangavar. From Hamadan he visited the ruined temple near Isfahan, the former capital of Persia.

Of special interest is the description of the tomb of Cyrus the Great. Thence he traveled to Persepolis and tells of its ancient monuments and Shiraz, the home of the Persian poets. At Yezd there are still Zoroastrians living whose religion and religious customs are older than the modern capital of Persia. Teheran is reached and the ruins of Rei, the ancient Ragha, are inspected. The journey through Persia ends with a trip through Mazandaran to the Caspian Sea.

The book is profusely illustrated with photographs, charts and reproductions of ancient monuments.

SPINOZA AND RELIGION. A Study of Spinoza's Metaphysics and of his particular utterances in regard to religion, with a view to determining the significance of his thoughts for religion and incidentally his personal attitude toward it. By *Elmer Ellsworth Powell, Ph. D.* Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1906. Price, \$1.50.

Professor Powell of Miami University after giving careful study to all the details of Spinoza's system of philosophy feels fully justified in agreeing with that German translator of the philosopher's works who claims that there is no other system in the whole history of human thought which is more difficult to understand and explain. This very special difficulty Professor Powell lays largely to the conditions of Spinoza's own environment and the age in which he lived when views that differed from the accepted orthodoxy were received with contempt and persecution. But though personal timidity and considerations of expediency were not wanting in the motives that actuated Spinoza "sometimes to conceal and sometimes to veil his real opinions, and occasionally even to express views diametrically opposed to his own," it is probably also true that he hoped to disseminate his doctrines more widely by expressing his thought in terms which were popularly associated with the prevalent religious conceptions.

After a biographical chapter, the *raison d'être* of the present book is made manifest in the second chapter of the "Introduction" which treats of "The Diversity of opinions in Regard to Spinoza's Relation to Religion." Here Mr.

Powell quotes the judgment of some twenty critics, more or less, who may be divided into many contradictory camps. This divergence in the expression of opinion, he says, is due in some cases to a superficial reading of Spinoza by which his doctrines are accepted unquestioningly on their face value and his terms interpreted according to the meaning the reader was accustomed to associate with them; in other cases to a lack of candor on the part of critics who seemed to think that to classify Spinoza's philosophy plainly as atheistic would be interpreted as a disloyal defamation of his character; and in still other instances to the fact that "many expressions which imply opposite views of Spinoza's attitude toward religion represent at bottom different opinions, not in regard to Spinoza's teaching, but in regard to what constitutes religion on the one hand and atheism on the other." But of the diametrically opposite verdicts, Mr. Powell says that "in calling him an atheist, —if he used the term in its real sense as implying simply an anti-religious theory of the world, with no reflections on personal character,—Velthuysen gave to Spinoza a title to which, in a less intolerant age, he himself would not have objected. Of the title 'God-intoxicated philosopher,' he would certainly have been ashamed."

Following a chapter on "Spinoza's Doctrine of Knowledge," Part I is devoted to a detailed study of "Spinoza's Conception of God," discussing his definition of Substance (God), its formal and real attributes and their contents, and closing with the relation of his conception of the Absolute to the religious consciousness.

Part II, "Particular Doctrines and Expressions supposed to imply Religious Views and Interest," is a critical examination of those conceptions which have often been mistaken for expressions of religious mysticism, for the sake of showing more clearly the relation of Spinoza's ethics to the ethics of religion. These "particular doctrines and expressions" are "The Intellectual Love of God," "Immortality," "Church and State," and also his treatment of the conceptions of miracles, revelation, sin, salvation, etc.

In a short "Conclusion" Mr. Powell sums up as follows the results of his presentation of the relation of Spinoza's teachings to religion:

"The right name for Spinoza's philosophy is Atheistic Monism. It represents a world-view which, in its essential features, is the very antithesis of that required by the religious consciousness. Particular utterances of Spinoza's which, taken by themselves, seem obviously to express religious conceptions and religious feeling, evaporate under critical examination into mere phraseology; a part of which may be made intelligible by translating it into terms of his atheistic philosophy, while a residuum remains unintelligible, although it is accounted for by his demonstrable purpose of sometimes accommodating his language to the religious views of the time.

"Personally Spinoza had no religious interest properly so called, but only a scientific interest in religion; which is something quite different. In fact, it is hardly too much to say that the only interest he had in anything was scientific, philosophical. He made religion the object of reflection, not because it lay near his heart, but because the peculiar circumstances of his life thrust the subject in the way of his active intellect."

Professor Powell's treatment of this difficult subject is frank and scholarly. He believes that the fairest presentation of a thinker's views is the one

that expresses them the most clearly with all their necessary implications, rather than one that would attempt to classify the system under some popularly acceptable designation. He quotes continually from Spinoza's own words, and always gives the exact reference to the passage quoted in order that contexts may be consulted and translations verified, and in equivocal cases furnishes in a footnote the original expression in Latin, or Dutch where the Latin is not extant. The book will certainly be a great benefit to all who begin to make the acquaintance of Spinoza through his somewhat confusing writings, and to those whose patience is tried by the conflicting opinions of his many critics. In its fairness and direct treatment it will be welcome also to the experienced student of this somewhat troublesome philosopher whom Pierre Bayle has styled "the greatest atheist that ever lived."

THE DIVINE NAME IN EXODUS, III, 14. By *William R. Arnold*. Reprinted from the *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 1905.

The passage which is the subject of this article reads: "And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM: and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM has sent me unto you. And God said moreover unto Moses, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, The Lord God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, hath sent me unto you; this is my name forever, and this is my memorial unto all generations."

The problem consists in this, that Yahveh here reveals his name to Moses, and yet he does not use the name "Yahveh," but the word '*Ehyeh*' which is translated in our version by "I am." Professor Arnold claims, not without a good support of argument, that this should not be translated "I am," but must be regarded as a name, which is simply a substitute for the word Yahveh, and replaced the latter at a time when the name was deemed so holy that it was considered blasphemous to utter it even in reverence. Such substitutions were quite common, and the substitution '*Ehyeh*' which literally means "I shall be," is one of them.

The preceding passage, "I am that I am," should according to Professor Arnold be cut out as a later gloss which crept in the text and had originally been written as a marginal note to explain the name '*Ehyeh*', "I shall be," incorporating the redactor's interpretation of this new and uncommon appellation of God.

Professor Arnold further insists that the idea of eternity is not in the mind of the author, in either the original passage or the added gloss, for such an abstract conception of God as representing "existence," or even "eternal existence" is absolutely foreign to the ancient Israelites. It is a modern idea and smacks more of Greek philosophy than of ancient Semitic religion. It might be Indian or modern but not Hebrew, and he explains the gloss to mean "I will be whatever I choose."

The name Yahveh, originally used exclusively by the Southern tribes only, is here for the first time introduced into the Elohim text. It is not used for the first time in the Old Testament, but it is new to the Elohist writer who now adopts it for the entire people as the name of the God of Israel. Therefore Yahveh is here identified with the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, and it is added "This [the name Yahveh] is my name forever,